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Abstract
This study presents a two-class successive generations model with human capital
accumulation and the choice to opt out of public education. The model demonstrates
the mutual interaction between inequality and education choice and shows that this
interaction leads to two locally stable steady-state equilibria. The existence of mul-
tiple stable equilibria implies a negative association between inequality and public
education enrollment, which is consistent with evidence from Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. This study also presents
a welfare analysis using data from OECD countries and shows that introducing a
compulsory public education system leaves the rst generation worse o, although
it realizes an equal society and improves welfare for future generations of lower-class
individuals.
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1 Introduction
Compulsory school attendance laws, enforced in nearly all developed countries, require
parents to have their children attend public or private school for a designated period.
Public schools are entirely funded by local and state taxes, whereas private schools tend
to obtain funding by charging their students tuition fees. Parents can choose either
option depending on their income and preferences. Because public schooling is a kind of
government intervention, higher-income parents who benet less from it are more likely to
choose private schooling. Therefore, we expect an association between higher inequality
and higher enrollment (or larger spending) in private education institutions, as observed
in data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries depicted in Figure 1.1
[Figure 1 is here.]
de la Croix and Doepke (2009) develop a political economy theory that attempts to
explain the above-mentioned association. They assume an exogenous income distribution
and focus on the extent to which expanding inequality aects education choice. However,
the reverse eect, namely the eect of education choice on inequality, is abstracted from
their analysis.2 Indeed, studies suggest that the reverse eect is important (Saint-Paul
and Verdier, 1993; Zhang, 1996) and that it exists across and within countries over time
(De Gregorio and Lee, 2002; Teulings and Van Rens, 2008).
The presence of this reverse eect implies a dynamic interaction between inequality
and education choice over time: inequality aects adults' education choices and subse-
quently governmental policy, and this in turn determines the degree of inequality in the
next generation. Cardak (2004a, 2004b) attempts to demonstrate this dynamic education
choice{inequality interaction in a two-period overlapping generations model. In partic-
ular, Cardak (2004a) focuses on two structural parameters, namely preferences for the
education of children and heritability of human capital from parents to children, and
shows that these are key factors in explaining the variations in inequality and education
choice.
The present study instead focuses on the initial conditions of inequality and aims
to demonstrate that two countries sharing the same structural parameters show dierent
1Exceptions are Belgium and South Korea. Belgium shows high enrollment and low private spending
because private schools are heavily subsidized by public funding (OECD, 2017 ). South Korea shows
low enrollment and high private spending because parents tend to spend much more on supplementary
private education due to excessive competition for entrance into schools and colleges (OECD, 2016).
2The reverse eect is briey analyzed in their discussion paper version (de la Croix and Doepke, 2003).
However, wages are assumed to be constant within and across generations. This point is further discussed
in Section 1.1.
1
paths of inequality and education choice in the short and long run depending on the initial
inequality conditions. In addition, we investigate the welfare implications of the dierences
from the political economy viewpoint. For this purpose, we follow the simple two-class
successive generations model with human capital accumulation presented by Gradstein
and Justman (1996) and de la Croix and Doepke (2004). We extend their frameworks
by introducing the choice to opt out of public education, as in Cardak (2004a, 2004b).
In particular, the model used in this study has two types of family dynasties classied
according to their level of human capital (i.e., a low type and a high type). Agents from
either type of family enter adulthood with a stock of human capital invested by their
parents, earn after-tax income, and obtain utility from consumption and their children's
human capital. Agents compare the maximized utility under each type of education and
choose the one with the highest value.
Every adult agent votes on the public education expenditure in each period. This
study assumes that the low type are the majority in the population. We compute the low
type's preferred public education expenditure and analyze the corresponding education
choice by adult agents. We show that low-type adults always choose public education
because they pay less than they receive from public education. However, the high type's
decision depends on income inequality. As inequality increases, the income discrepancy
between the two types increases and so does the high type's tax burden. Therefore, high-
type adults opt out of public education when inequality is high, while they choose public
education when inequality is low. Hence, two education choices exist depending on the
level of inequality in society.
As noted earlier, education choice and expenditure inuence human capital formation,
which in turn determines inequality in the next generation. We demonstrate this dynamic
interaction between inequality and education choice across generations and show that the
interaction leads to two locally stable steady-state equilibria. One steady state shows a
polarized income distribution with high-type agents opting out of public education; the
other steady state has perfect equality and full public education enrollment. The ndings
of this study are therefore novel in that they show the existence of multiple locally stable
steady-state equilibria, which were not fully demonstrated in Cardak (2004a, 2004b). In
addition, the nding of multiple equilibria implies a positive association between inequality
and private education choice, and this may help clarify the dierences in inequality and
education choice among countries sharing similar economic backgrounds as observed in
Figure 1.
To investigate the welfare implications of the presented model, we compare the utility
of the two steady states by considering an economic environment in which the equilib-
rium converges to the higher-inequality steady state. We then introduce an alternative
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education system into this environment, namely a compulsory public school system that
prohibits students from opting out of public school. This system forces the economy into
the lower-inequality steady state. Therefore, we can evaluate the multiple stable steady-
state equilibria by comparing the higher-inequality steady state in the mixed education
system with the steady state in the compulsory public school system.
We show by simulation that almost every generation of the high type is worse o by the
introduction of compulsory public schooling since expenditure on education departs from
its optimal level.3 However, the new system has a mixed eect on low-type agents. The
rst generation is worse o since the negative eect of the tax burden increase outweighs
the positive eect of the per capita public education expenditure increase. From the
second generation onward, there is an additional positive eect via the human capital
formation generated by the compulsory public school system. This eect together with
the positive eect of public education expenditure may outweigh the negative eect of the
tax burden. The result suggests an intergenerational trade-o and that the two equilibria
are not Pareto-ranked. It also suggests that the shift from a mixed education system to a
compulsory public school system that aims to improve equality is not Pareto-improving.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Next, we review the related
literature, followed by a description of the model in Section 2. Section 3 considers agents'
voting behavior and Section 4 describes the political equilibrium in each period. Section
5 shows the existence and stability of a steady-state equilibrium and claries the role of
the structural parameter values in the determination of inequality, individual education
choice, and policy. Section 6 presents a welfare analysis of the political equilibria in
addition to considering the welfare implications of a compulsory public school system as
an alternative. Section 7 oers some extensions to the basic model. Section 8 provides
concluding remarks. All proofs are provided in the appendices.
1.1 Related Literature
Apart from the studies mentioned above, this study is related to the following three strands
of the literature. The rst is the static analyses of public and private education choices
(e.g., Stiglitz, 1974; Epple and Romano, 1996; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998; Hoyt and
Lee, 1998; Bearse, Glomm and Patterson, 2005; de la Croix and Doepke, 2009; Arcalean
and Schiopu, 2015). In particular, the present study is closely related to de la Croix and
Doepke (2003). They rst introduce a static model that focuses on the eect of inequality
3The introduction of compulsory public schooling increases the average human capital level. This in
turn increases tax revenue and per capita public education expenditure, and thus may benet the future
type H. In fact, our simulation shows that the type-H is better o by the introduction of compulsory
public schooling roughly from generation 800 onward. Since this benet occurs in the far distant future,
we ignore such an improvement and hence conclude that almost every generation of the type H is worse
o.
3
on education choice. Within this framework, they present a multiplicity of equilibria
displaying a short-run positive association between inequality and enrollment in private
education institutions. Then, they extend their model by including the reverse eect
and show an example of a period-2 cycle. However, the long-run association observed in
Panel (a) of Figure 1 is not addressed. In addition, they assume constant wages within
and across generations, so a change in the population distribution is the only cause of
inequality. The present study advances the work of de la Croix and Doepke (2003) by
demonstrating endogenous wage determination via human capital accumulation. Within
this extended framework, we calibrate the model to a set of OECD member countries and
present a long-run multiplicity of equilibria under empirically plausible parameter values,
which is not fully addressed in de la Croix and Doepke (2003).
The second is the dynamic inequality analyses in public or private education regimes
(e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993; Gradstein and Just-
man, 1997; Benabou, 2000; de la Croix and Doepke, 2004; Galor, Moav, and Vollrath,
2009). However, this study departs from prior work by allowing for an endogenous edu-
cation choice accompanied by voting on education policy. While Gradstein and Justman
(1996) and Ono (2016) conduct similar analyses, they focus on private education as a sup-
plement to public education. The present study instead focuses on the ability to opt out
of public education, which leads to novel implications for the multiplicity and eciency
of the equilibria.4
The third strand relates to political economy analyses of redistribution and private ed-
ucation (Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2003; Hassler, Storesletten,
and Zilibotti, 2007; Arawatari and Ono, 2009, 2013). In earlier frameworks, the multiple
self-fullling expectations of agents on future in-cash redistribution policies were found to
create two types of equilibria: one characterized by low inequality and high redistribution
and the other characterized by high inequality and low redistribution. This multiple equi-
libria story implies a negative correlation between inequality and redistribution. While
this is relevant to our study, these earlier works consider private education and in-cash
transfers, while our study instead focuses on in-kind public education provision and allows
for private education as an alternative choice.
4Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2015) also focus on the ability to opt out of public education. They
employ a model with innitely lived households and assume that such households choose education (i.e.,
private or public schooling) at the beginning of the economy and commit to their decisions in the following
periods. The present study instead employs a model with overlapping generations and assumes that each
generation chooses education from the viewpoint of its utility maximization. This assumption enables us
to demonstrate changes in education choices across time and generations.
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2 Model
We consider a discrete time successive generations economy beginning at time 1. The
economy is populated by individuals who live in two periods (youth and adulthood) and
belong to one of two types of family dynasties indexed by i 2 fL;Hg. This assumption
simplies the real economy, but it enables us to demonstrate the dynamic motion of
inequality in a tractable way.
A type-i adult in period 1 is endowed with hi1 units of human capital, where 0 < h
L
1 <
hH1 . Thus, type-L and type-H individuals in period-1 have low and high human capital,
respectively. As demonstrated below, members of type H endogenously choose more
education for their children than members of type L, meaning that inequality always exists
within the two types. However, the extent of this inequality is determined endogenously
through individuals' choices.
Each adult produces one child; thus, the population remains constant from generation
to generation. The proportion of type-L individuals within each generation is , leaving
1  as the proportion of type-H individuals, where  is constant across generations and
satises 0:5 <  < 1. Therefore, type-L individuals are the majority in the economy in
every period, which reects the real-world right-skewed income distribution.
2.1 Preferences and Budget Constraints
Upon entering adulthood at time t, a type-i individual has a stock of human capital hit
that denes his or her eective labor capacity. He or she then inelastically supplies his
or her human capital to rms to receive wages. We assume that wages are normalized to
one in each period, implying that labor income is equal to the human capital level.
A type-i adult of generation t derives utility from his or her current consumption, cit,
and from his or her child's anticipated future income, hit+1. Consequently, we can express
the agent's preferences with the following utility function:
uit = ln c
i
t +  lnh
i
t+1;
where (> 0) is a common parameter that reects the bequest motive. We employ this
logarithmic utility function to make our analysis more manageable.
Adults have a choice between public and private education for their children, which
they choose to maximize utility. However, regardless of their choice, they must pay income
taxes to nance public education. Therefore, the budget constraint of a type-i adult in
period t is
cit + e
i
t  (1  t)hit;
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where eit( 0) denotes type-i's private education expenditure in period t and t is the
period-t income tax rate.5
Let qit 2 f0; 1g denote a binary variable representing type i's education choice: qit = 0
when choosing private education and qit = 1 when choosing public education. The child's
level of education, hit+1, is determined by his or her parents' human capital, h
i
t, and the
parents' choice of schooling, either xt or e
i
t, where xt is per capita public education. In
particular, we assume hit+1 = D (h
i
t)
1 
(qitxt + (1  qit) eit), where D(> 0) is the total
factor productivity of human capital and  2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of schooling. We
assume the following with respect to  and .
Assumption 1.  2 (0; 1).
Assumption 1 is satised as long as  2 (0; 1). In Section 6, we estimate  based on
data from OECD countries and nd that  = 0:138: This estimate ts well with Cardak's
(2004a) estimate of 0:13 and de la Croix and Doepke's (2004) estimate of 0:169.
2.2 Education Choice
Given the tax rate, public education, and his or her human capital, each adult chooses
consumption and education to maximize his or her utility subject to the budget constraint.
In particular, he or she compares the maximum utility of each education choice and
chooses the option with the highest value.
Suppose that a type-i adult chooses private education, qit = 0. He or she solves the
utility maximization problem by allocating disposable income between private education
and consumption as follows:
eit =

1 + 
(1  t)hit;
cit =
1
1 + 
(1  t)hit:
The type-i adult's utility from providing private education for his or her child, denoted
by V ie;t, is
V ie;t = (1 + ) ln(1  t)hit +  lnD
 
hit
1 
+  ln; (1)
where
  
(1 + )(1+)=
:
5Private education in the present framework is assumed to be fully funded by the tuition fees paid
by students' parents. However, purely private education is limited, and many private schools in OECD
countries receive some government subsidies to bridge the revenue gap. The present model should be
understood as a simplication of real private schooling.
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Alternatively, suppose that the type-i adult chooses public education, qit = 1. He or
she chooses eit = 0; and thus consumes all disposable income. In this case, the type-i
adult's utility from choosing public education for his or her child, denoted by V ix;t, is
V ix;t = ln(1  t)hit +  lnD
 
hit
1 
+  lnxt: (2)
Given the set of policies, (xt; t), each adult chooses between these education alterna-
tives for his or her child to maximize utility. We assume that each adult chooses private
education when the two alternatives are indierent. Therefore, the type-i adult's educa-
tion choice is
qit =

1 (public education) if V ix;t > V
i
e;t , (1  t)hit < xt;
0 (private education) if V ix;t  V ie;t , (1  t)hit  xt: (3)
The timing of events in period t is as follows. First, adult agents vote on public
education, xt. Given the voting outcome, the tax rate t is set to satisfy the government's
budget constraint. Second, given xt and t, each agent chooses either public or private
education to maximize his or her utility. In choosing private education, agents decide how
to divide their disposable income between consumption and private education subject to
their budget constraints. We follow the backward induction approach to solve this multi-
stage game. In particular, we rst solve the second-stage problem in Section 3 and then
solve the rst-stage problem in Section 4.
3 Period-t Economic Equilibrium
We dene the period-t economic equilibrium in the present model as follows.
Denition 1. Given hit (i = L;H) and xt, the period-t economic equilibrium is a set
of an allocation,

qit; c
i
t; e
i
t; h
i
t+1
	
i=L;H
and a tax rate, t, such that the following
conditions hold:
(i) Given hit; xt; and t; a type-i agent chooses q
i
t and the corresponding c
i
t and e
i
t to
maximize his or her utility;
(ii) Given hit; xt; and q
i
t; t is set to satisfy the government's budget constraint,

qLt + q
H
t (1  )
	
xt =
tht;
(iii) Given hit; xt; and (q
i
t; e
i
t), which satisfy conditions (i) and (ii), h
i
t+1 is determined by
hit+1 = D (h
i
t)
1 
(qitxt + (1  qit) eit) :
To nd the period-t economic equilibrium solution, we introduce an inequality index
t. Let ht denote the average human capital in period t; ht  hLt +(1 )hHt ; and let t
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denote the ratio of hLt to ht;
t  h
L
t
ht
2 (0; 1] :
The index t suggests that a larger (smaller) t implies lower (higher) income inequality
between the high-type and low-type groups, and thus a more equal (unequal) society. By
using this inequality index and the denition of average human capital, we can rewrite
the ratio hHt =ht as
hHt
ht
=
1  t
1   :
Therefore, we replace the two state variables hLt and h
H
t with ht and t in the following
analysis.
By using the denitions of ht and t; we can reformulate the condition in (3) and
obtain the corresponding pair of education choices in the period-t economic equilibrium.
First, suppose that both types of adults choose private education,
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (0; 0).
Condition (ii) in Denition 1 implies that the government's budget constraint is reduced
to t = 0 because no agent will choose public education. By substituting t = 0 into (3)
and rearranging the terms, we obtain 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (0; 0) if xt  x00t  tht; (4)
where the superscript \00" of x00t implies
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (0; 0).
Second, suppose that only type-L adults choose public education,
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0).
The government's budget constraint is xt = tht. By substituting this into (3) and
rearranging the terms, we obtain
qLt = 1 if x
10
t 
t
1 + t
ht < xt;
qHt = 0 if xt  xt 
 (1  t) =(1  )
1 +  (1  t) =(1  )ht;
where the superscript \10" of x10t means
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0) and the bar of xt indicates the
upper limit of xt, which induces type-H adults to choose private education. Therefore,
we obtain  
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0) if x10t < xt  xt. (5)
Third, suppose that both types of adults choose public education,
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 1).
The government's budget constraint is then xt = tht: Following the same procedure
above, we obtain
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 1) if x11t 
 (1  t) =(1  )
1 +  (1  t) =(1  )ht < xt; (6)
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where the superscript \11" of x11t indicates
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 1). Finally, the case
 
qLt ; q
H
t

=
(0; 1) is not feasible in the present framework because of the income distribution assump-
tion.
The analysis thus far suggests that education choice is aected by the four threshold
values of xt, denoted by x
00
t ; x
10
t ; xt; and x
11
t . The order of these values depends on the
inequality t. In particular, there are three critical values of t; denoted by 
l; m; and
h; where 0 < l < m < h < 1, such that8<:
x00t 7 x11t , t 7 l;
x00t 7 xt , t 7 m;
x10t 7 x11t , t 7 h:
(7)
We provide the proof of (7) in Appendix A.1. Figure 2 illustrates the four cases of t that
classify the ordering of the four threshold values of xt and the corresponding education
choice by each type of adult. Figure 3 summarizes the four cases, which are precisely
stated in the following proposition.
[Figure 2 here.]
[Figure 3 here.]
Proposition 1. There is a unique period-t economic equilibrium if any of the following
three conditions hold: (i) xt  min fx10t ; x11t g ; (ii) max fxt; x00t g < xt; or (iii) t 2 
0; l

and xt 2 [x00t ; x11t ]. Otherwise, there are multiple period-t economic equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The result in Proposition 1 suggests that the economic equilibrium is unique if the
level of public education is low or high. If not, there are multiple equilibria or a unique
equilibrium. To understand this result, let us rst consider the case of a low x such that
xt  min fx10t ; x11t g. Because of the low level of public education expenditure, the tax rate
could be reduced to satisfy the government's budget constraint, regardless of education
choice. This fact implies a low tax burden, making private education more aordable
even for type-L adults. Therefore, there is a unique economic equilibrium at which both
types of adults choose private education if xt  min fx10t ; x11t g.
Second, consider the case of a high x such that max fxt; x00t g < xt. The government
is required to set a high tax rate to satisfy its budget constraint. This creates a negative
income eect, which in turn makes private education less aordable, even for type-H
adults. Thus, there is a unique economic equilibrium at which both types of adults
choose public education if max fxt; x00t g < xt.
Finally, for the intermediate case such that min fx10t ; x11t g < xt  max fxt; x00t g, the
uniqueness or multiplicity of the equilibria depend on the tax rate that satises the
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government's budget constraint. For example, consider a low inequality case such that
t 2
 
0; l

holds, as illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 2, and focus on the public education
expenditure level with xt 2 (x11t ; xt] : If the tax rate is suciently low that t = xt=ht;
then type-H adults can aord to invest in private education, and this choice is consis-
tent with the condition of t = xt=ht. However, if the tax rate is suciently high that
t = xt=ht, then they nd it optimal to choose public rather than private education from
the viewpoint of utility maximization. This choice is consistent with t = xt=ht.
4 Period-t Political Equilibrium
Based on the characterization of the period-t economic equilibrium in Section 3, we demon-
strate voting on education policy. We assume that adults vote sincerely since every agent
has zero mass and thus no individual vote can change the outcome. In addition, in each
period t, adult agents determine public education through a political process of majority
voting. Assuming  > 0:5; type-L adults constitute the majority. Therefore, the politi-
cal objective function in period t, denoted by 
t, is the indirect utility function of adult
type-L agents.
Denition 2. Given t, a period-t political equilibrium is a level of public education
expenditure, xt, such that xt maximizes type-L adults' utility subject to each type's
education choice as well as the corresponding consumption functions and govern-
ment's budget constraints.
We write the period-t political objective function according to the pair of education
choices,
 
qLt ; q
H
t

demonstrated in (4), (5), and (6). Recall that the government's budget
constraint is
tht =

xt if
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0);
xt if
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 1);

and substitute this into the indirect utility function for type-L adults. Then, the political
objective function becomes

t =
8><>:

00;t  V Le;t

t=0
= (1 + ) lnhtt +  lnD (htt)
1  +  ln if (qLt ; q
H
t ) = (0; 0);

10;t  V Lx;t

t=xt=ht
= ln (ht   xt) t +  lnD (htt)1  +  lnxt if (qLt ; qHt ) = (1; 0);

11;t  V Lx;t

t=xt=ht
= ln (ht   xt) t +  lnD (htt)1  +  lnxt if (qLt ; qHt ) = (1; 1):
(8)
The functions 
00;t; 
10;t; 
11;t have the following properties: 
00;t is independent of
xt because both types opt out of public education, whereas 
10;t and 
11;t depend on xt
because either or both types choose public education. In particular, the solutions that
maximize 
10;t and 
11;t are, respectively(
argmax
10;t = x

t  (1+)ht;
argmax
11;t = x

t  1+ht (< xt ) :
(9)
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In addition, the following conditions hold:8>><>>:

11;t < 
10;t 8xt > 0;
x00t < x

t = argmax
11;t;

10;tjxt=x00t < 
00;t;

00;t < 
11;tjxt=xt < 
10;tjxt=xt ;
(10)
where the proof is provided in Appendix A.3.
Given ht and t; the period-t political equilibrium solution is xt = argmax
t and the
corresponding education choices are in (4), (5), and (6). The tax rate is set to satisfy the
government's budget constraint. In the following, we consider two cases: a low-inequality
state, t 2 [m; 1], where xt  x00t holds, and a high-inequality state, t 2 (0; m), where
x00t < xt holds.
4.1 A Low-inequality State: t 2 [m; 1]
The education choice when [m; 1] is depicted in Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2. Figure
4 shows the corresponding political objective function. For illustration purposes, we use
the properties of 
t in (9) and (10).
[Figure 4 here.]
When xt is below (above) the critical value x
00
t ; the government expects both types
of adults to choose private (public) education, and the adults actually make that choice.
When xt is below x
00
t , there are at most three economic equilibria. However, the govern-
ment nds it optimal to expect that both types of adults choose private education because
this choice attains the highest utility for xt  x00t . Thus, the political objective function
is

t =


00;t if 0 < xt  x00t ;

11;t if x
00
t < xt < ht:
The solution that maximizes 
t is x

t = argmax
11;t because 
11;tjxt=xt > 
00;t holds,
as shown in (10).
Lemma 1. For t 2 [m; 1] ; the period-t the voting solution is xt = argmax
11;t.
Type-L adults pay less than they receive from public education and thus prefer public
education to private education. As decisive voters, they choose the per capita public
education expenditure given their expectations of type-H voters' choices. Type-H adults
may prefer private education to public education because they pay more than they receive
from the latter. However, their costs of providing public education in terms of their
utility decrease as t increases (i.e., as their income level relative to the average, h
H
t =ht =
(1  t) = (1  ), decreases). In particular, if t is above m; the benets in terms of
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utility outweigh the costs of public education to type-H adults, and thus these adults
nd it optimal to choose public education. Therefore, when inequality is suciently low
that m  t  1, it is optimal for type-L adults to choose a per capita public education
expenditure of xt = argmax
11;t, given the expectation that type-H adults also choose
public education.
4.2 A High-inequality State: t 2 (0; m)
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 show the education choice when t 2 (0; m). Figure 5
illustrates the corresponding political objective function. Because the government nds
it optimal to expect the education choice that attains the highest utility, the political
objective function when t 2 (0; m) is

t =
8<:

00;t if 0 < xt  x00t ;

10;t if x
00
t < xt  xt;

11;t if xt < xt < ht:
The main dierence from the previous case is that the political objective might be max-
imized at xt 2 (x00t ; xt], where type-H adults opt out of public education, while type-L
adults do not.
[Figure 5 here.]
To nd a political equilibrium solution, consider the following two cases: xt  xt as
illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 5 and xt > xt as illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 5.
Consider rst the case when xt  xt , t    (1   (1  ) =) =(< m): As
the gure shows, 
t is maximized at x

t = argmax
10;t: At this public education level,
type-H adults opt out of public education, while type-L adults do not. This case arises as
a political equilibrium outcome when inequality is suciently high that t 2 (0; ). This
set is non-empty if and only if  > = (+ ). Therefore, there is a period-t political
equilibrium with (qLt ; q
H
t ) = (1; 0) and xt = x

t if t 2 (0; ) and  2 (= (+ ) ; 1).
Next, consider the case when xt > xt , t >  as in Panel (b) of Figure 5. As the
gure shows, there are two candidates for the period-t voting solution: one is xt = xt,
where type-H adults opt out of public education, and the other is xt = argmax
11;t = x

t ,
where both types of adults choose public education. Type-L adults, as decisive voters,
choose either education type to maximize utility. Appendix A.4 shows that there is a
critical value of t, denoted by 
 2 (; m), such that 
10;tjxt=xt 7 
11;tjxt=xt , t ?
. The following lemma summarizes the results thus far.
Lemma 2. Assume t 2 (0; m) : Given t and ht; the period-t voting solution is
argmax
t =
8><>:
xt = argmax
11;t if t 2 (; m) ;
xt = argmax
10;t if t 2 (0; ] and  2


+
; 1

;
xt if t 2 (max (0; ) ; ] :
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Consider rst a situation where t 2 (0; ] and  2


+
; 1

hold: type-H adults are
endowed with a suciently high income level but they have a low share of the population
in their generation. They thus choose private education because they benet less from
public education because of its lower per capita expenditure. Given this choice by type-H
adults, 
10;t is the indirect utility function of type-L adults. As decisive voters, they choose
the per capita public education expenditure xt that maximizes 
10;t, x

t = argmax
10;t.
As Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows, this choice is feasible if xt  xt. In the current situation,
the condition xt  xt actually holds because the low share of type-H individuals in the
generation is equivalent to a high share of those of type L, which thus implies a low per
capita level of public education expenditure.
Next, consider a situation where t 2 (max (0; ) ; ] holds: inequality is high but less
severe than that observed in the rst case. Type-H adults still prefer private to public
education, but type-L adults cannot choose an \interior" solution, xt = argmax
10;t.
Their choice is constrained by the upper limit, xt. We hereafter refer to xt as a \corner"
solution. Finally, if inequality is suciently low that t 2 (; m) ; type-H adults choose
public education and the political objective is maximized at xt = argmax
11;t:
The corner solution arises when the proportion of type-L adults is suciently low
that  2 (1=2; = (+ )]. A low  implies a small tax burden for each agent for the
given level of public education expenditure x: This lowers the marginal cost of public
education, thereby inducing type-L adults to prefer higher public education expenditure.
However, type-H adults will opt out when public education expenditure is below xt. If
such expenditure is above xt, type-H adults prefer public to private education. Therefore,
the upper limit, xt, constrains type-L adults' choice of public education as long as type-H
adults opt out of public education.
4.3 Voting Outcome and Education Choice
Summarizing the results in Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain the voting solution in period t
and the corresponding education choice.
Proposition 2. Given the inequality index t; the period-t voting solution, (xt; t), is
(xt; t) =
8>>><>>>:

xt ;

1+

if t 2 (; 1] ;
xt ;

1+

if t 2 (0; ] and  2


+
; 1

;
xt;
(1 t)
(1 )+(1 t)

otherwise.
The corresponding education choice is 
qL; qH

=

(1; 1) if t 2 (; 1] ;
(1; 0) if t 2 (0; ] .
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Proposition 2 states that type-H adults choose public education if inequality is su-
ciently low that t 2 (; 1]; otherwise, they choose private education. A small t implies
a high income disparity between the two types of adults, meaning that type-H adults
could owe a large tax burden. In particular, if t  , the negative tax burden eect
dominates the positive eect of public education. This fact incentivizes type-H adults
to opt out of public education. However, if inequality is suciently low that t > 
,
the positive public education eect outweighs the negative tax burden eect and type-H
adults choose public education.
To consider the implications of the result in Proposition 2 more in detail, we compare
a low-inequality economy with t > 
 and a high-inequality economy with t  . In
particular, we consider two possible cases of the high-inequality economy. The rst case
is that it is distinguished by xt = x

t as observed in Panel (a) of Figure 5. In this case,
the two economies dier with respect to the enrollment rates in public schooling, but
they are identical in terms of tax burdens. The high-inequality economy experiences a
lower enrollment rate in public schooling than the low-inequality economy. This fact may
imply a lower tax burden for individuals in the high-inequality economy. However, this
positive tax burden eect is oset by the higher per capita public education expenditure.
Thus, the aggregate public education expenditure and corresponding tax rates are the
same between the two economies.
The second case is that the high-inequality economy is distinguished by xt = xt, as
observed in Panel (b) of Figure 5. The per capita public education expenditure in this
case, xt = xt, is lower than that in the former case. This fact implies that the positive
tax burden eect outweighs the negative per capita public education expenditure eect in
the high-inequality economy. Thus, the high-inequality economy experiences a lower tax
burden and a lower enrollment rate in public schooling compared with the low-inequality
economy. The United States and the United Kingdom are examples of high-inequality
economies, whereas Nordic countries are examples of low-inequality economies.
5 Steady-state Equilibrium
The analysis in the previous section demonstrated that public education expenditure can
serve as a political outcome for a given inequality index, t. Public education expendi-
ture inuences human capital formation, which in turn determines inequality in the next
generation, t+1. To consider the dynamic interaction between inequality and public ed-
ucation, we demonstrate the movement in the inequality index across periods as well as
the existence and stability of a steady-state equilibrium in which t+1 = t holds along the
equilibrium path.
Given the initial condition, 1(> 0); the political equilibrium sequence ftg is charac-
14
terized by the rst-order dierence equation, t+1 = P (t), where
P (t) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
P11 (t) 

+ (1  )

1
t
  
1  1
if t 2 (; 1] ;
P10 (t) 

+


1+

(1  t)

1
t
1  1
if t 2 (0; ] and  2


+
; 1

,
P10 (t) 

+ (1  ) (1 + )1=

1 t
(1 )t
1  1
otherwise.
where the subscripts \11" and \10" in P () imply  qL; qH = (1; 1) and (1; 0), respec-
tively. The three cases correspond to those in Proposition 2. Appendix A.5 provides the
derivations of P11 (t) ; P10 (t) and P10 (t).
A closer analysis of P () reveals that the function has the following properties (see
Appendix A.6 for the formal proof of the following statement). First, P11 () ; P10 () and
P10 () are strictly increasing in t. Second, P10 () R P10 () if and only if t R . Third,
P10 () < P11 () 8t 2 (0; 1]. Fourth, P11 () satises P11 (1) = 1 and P 011 (1) = 1    2
(0; 1). Fifth, P10 () satises P10 (0) = 0 and lim!0
 
@ P10 () =@t

= 1; P10 () satises
P10 (0) = 0; and lim!0 (@P10 () =@t) = 1. These properties imply that (i) there is a
locally stable steady-state equilibrium with  = 1 and (ii) P () is strictly increasing in
t but discontinuous at t = 
. Figure 6 illustrates the possible patterns of P () when
 2 (= (+ ) ; 1). The  2 (1=2; = (+ )] case is qualitatively similar, but the
threshold value  is negative and thus irrelevant. From the gure, we obtain the following
proposition.
[Figure 6 here.]
Proposition 3. If P10 (
) > , there is a unique stable steady-state equilibrium with
 = 1 ; if P10 (
)  , there are two locally stable steady-state equilibria, one
with  2 (0; ] and the other with  = 1.
The unique stable steady-state equilibrium is distinguished by perfect equality between
the two types of agents and 100% enrollment in public schooling:  = 1 and
 
qL; qH

=
(1; 1) (see Panel (a) of Figure 6). However, another type of equilibrium exists when
multiple stable steady states are realized (see Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 6), distinguished
by the presence of income inequality and type-H agents opting out of public education:
 < 1 and
 
qL; qH

= (1; 0). Thus, the gure shows low inequality and low (i.e., no)
enrollment in private education institutions in the former steady-state equilibrium and
high inequality and high enrollment in the latter. These multiple steady states that are
unique to the present model imply that higher inequality is associated with lower public
education enrollment. The model implications are thus consistent with the empirical
pattern observed in Panel (a) of Figure 1.
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To consider the movement of inequality across periods more in detail, let us rst
consider the low-inequality case where t > 
. In this case, both types of agents choose
public education for their children,
 
qL; qH

= (1; 1), and this choice reduces inequality in
the next generation. Because of this positive eect on equality, the economy eventually
converges to the perfect equality state with  = 1 and
 
qL; qH

= (1; 1).
Next, consider the high-inequality case where t  . In this case, type-H adults opt
out of public schooling and instead choose private education for their children: qH = 0.
This choice works to expand inequality in the next generation, whereas type-L adults'
choice of public education, qL = 1, works in the opposite direction. Which eect outweighs
the other depends on the inequality level. When inequality is high (low), the positive
eect on equality produced by the choice of type-L adults is larger (smaller) than the
negative eect caused by the choice by type-H adults. This fact implies that the inequality
level converges to a steady state where only type-L adults choose public education (i.e., 
qL; qH

= (1; 0)), with its decreasing (increasing) trend across generations.
For an intuitive interpretation of the condition P10 (
) ?  in Proposition 3, we
reformulate it as
P10 (
) ?  , 1  

1   
1

? (1 + )1= ; (11)
where , dened in Subsection 4.2, satises 
10;tjxt=xt = 
11;tjxt=xt , or
1  
1  

= 1 +   1  

1   ;  

(1 + )(1+)=
: (12)
Eq. (12) indicates that  is a function of  and ,  =  (; ). Thus, we can
illustrate the condition in (11) in a    space, as Figure 7 shows. The gure suggests
that the model is more likely to produce multiple steady-state equilibria if  and  are
lower.
[Figure 7 here.]
To explain this argument, we rst consider the eect of . A low  means a low weight
attached to the utility of children's human capital, while a low  means low elasticity in
human capital with respect to public education expenditure. These factors imply that
type-L agents, as decisive voters, attach less weight to the utility of public education,
meaning that they prefer lower public education expenditure. This in turn means that
type-H agents gain more from opting out of public education. In addition, their tax
burden could be reduced or unchanged by choosing private education. Because of these
positive eects, a low  encourages type-H adults to opt out of public education and to
attain an equilibrium with  < 1.
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Next, we consider the role of  in the steady-state equilibria outcome. Recall the
denition of t+1  hLt+1=ht+1; or,
t+1  h
L
t+1
ht+1
=
hLt+1
hLt+1 + (1  )hHt+1
:
This expression indicates that the parameter  has two eects in the determination of
t+1. First, given h
H
t+1, a lower  implies a larger proportion of type-H agents. This fact
leads to higher average human capital, ht+1, and thus a lower t+1  hLt+1=ht+1 for a given
hLt+1. Second, a lower  implies lower aggregate public education expenditure and thus
a lower tax burden on type-H agents. This produces a positive income eect on private
education expenditure by type-H agents, in turn increasing the human capital of type-H
adults, hHt+1, and average human capital, ht+1; hence, this decreases t+1. Because of these
two negative eects, the model produces an equilibrium with t+1 < 1 if  is low.
However, an economy with a low  and  also has an equilibrium with  = 1 if the
initial condition of  is high. A higher  implies a lower income gap and thus lower income
for type-H agents. Because of this negative income eect, type-H agents nd it optimal
to choose public education over private education. Therefore, an equilibrium with  = 1
for low values of  and  also exists.
Thus far, we have assumed that human capital productivity, represented by D, is
common between the two types of agents. However, D may represent a durable productive
asset such as generic ability, technology transfer, or business succession that children
inherit from parents. Based on this view, we can alternatively assume that the distribution
of D is positively correlated with human capital, DH > DL, where Di (i = H;L) is
the human capital productivity of type-i agents (Gradstein and Justman, 1996). This
assumption implies that, on average, children born to higher-income families are endowed
with greater human capital productivity (Behrman and Taubman, 1989).
Under this alternative assumption, the law of the motion of human capital when
(qL; qH) = (1; 1) is reformulated as
t+1 =
"
+
DH
DL
(1  )

1
t
  
1 # 1
:
This equation implies a stable steady-state equilibrium with  < 1, which seems more
realistic than the equilibrium with  = 1, which assumes DH = DL = D. However, the
qualitative results remain unchanged. Therefore, for analytical tractability, we retain the
assumption of DH = DL = D in the following analysis.
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6 Welfare Analysis
We use simulations to investigate the model's welfare implications. In the analysis, we set
the parameters ; ; ; and D as in the following. First, recall that 1  is the proportion
of type-H agents and only type-H agents opt out of public schooling. The proportion
1   therefore represents enrollment in private primary institutions as a percentage. We
set 1    at 0:124 because the average enrollment rate in the high-inequality group in
Figure 1 was 12:4% during 2000{2013. Appendix A.7 describes the data source and the
classication of high- and low-inequality groups.
Second, for ; we focus on the public education expenditure{GDP ratio in the steady-
state equilibrium distinguished by  = 1: The ratio in this equilibrium is x=h = =(1 +
). We can estimate  by using the average ratio of expenditure on primary-level
public education to GDP observed in the low-inequality group in Figure 1. The average
ratio in that group was 0:0150 during 2000{2013, allowing us to determine  by solving
0:015 = =(1 + ) for :  ' 0:0152:
Third, the estimate in Card and Krueger (1992) implies an elasticity of school quality
of 0:12. In addition, simulation studies suggest that  is in the range from 0:1 to 0:3
(Cardak, 2004a) and from 0:05 to 0:15 (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998). Following these
results, we set  = 0:11. Thus, with  = 0:0152, we have  = 0:138. This estimate ts
well with that of 0:13 by Cardak (2004a) and that of 0:169 by de la Croix and Doepke
(2004). Finally, we normalize D to D = 1: The values of  and  obtained here satisfy
the conditions that realize the multiple equilibria depicted in Figure 7. Thus the analysis
shows multiple stable steady-state equilibria under empirically plausible parameters.
The existence of multiple equilibria indicates that a country with high initial inequal-
ity falls into the higher inequality state, whereas a country with low initial inequality
converges to the lower inequality state. The former country is thus inferior to the latter
in terms of equality. One way to resolve this problem is to introduce a compulsory public
school system as an alternative education regime. This limited education choice forces
the economy into a steady state with perfect equality, which is identical to the steady
state with  = 1 in the mixed education system analyzed thus far.
The introduction of compulsory public schooling improves inequality, but another
question is raised: does compulsory public schooling benet individuals in terms of utility?
To answer this question, we compare the two systems in the following way. We set the
initial conditions hL1 and h
H
1 to attain an equilibrium path that converges to the unequal
steady state with  < 1 in the mixed education system. Then, as illustrated in Figure
8, we take the ratios of mixed education systems to compulsory public school systems in
terms of per capita public education expenditure (Panel (a)), type-L agents' utility (Panel
(b)), type-H agents' utility (Panel (c)), and social welfare dened by a weighted average
18
utility of the two types, V L + (1  )V H (Panel (d)). We plot these from generation 1
to generation 80 for the three initial inequality scenarios.6
[Figure 8 here.]
In Panel (a), a ratio of more than one implies that expenditure in the compulsory
public school system is higher than that in the mixed education system. In Panels (b){
(d), a ratio of less than one implies that utility in the compulsory public school system is
higher than that in the mixed education system because the logarithmic utility function
takes negative values in the numerical analysis. For example, the ratio in Panel (b)
is 0:99(< 1) if V L =  1:0 ( 1:01) in the compulsory public school (mixed education)
system. Table 1 summarizes the numerical results from generation 1 to generation 4.
[Table 1 here.]
To interpret the results in Figure 8 and Table 1, we rst note the indirect utility of
type-L agents:
V Lmix;t = ln (ht   xt)
hLt
ht
+  lnD
 
hLt
1 
+  ln xt;
V Lcomp;t = ln (ht   xt )
hLt
ht
+  lnD
 
hLt
1 
+  lnxt ;
where V Lmix;t and V
L
comp;t are the indirect utility in the mixed education system and com-
pulsory public school system, respectively.
These expressions show that introducing a compulsory public school system has op-
posing eects on the utility of type-L agents. First, the tax burden increases from xt
to xt . Second, per capita public education expenditure may increase from xt to x

t .
The numerical result in Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows that expenditure increases for the
two lower initial inequality scenarios. However, for the highest initial inequality scenario
(represented by the dashed curve), expenditure on compulsory public schooling outweighs
that in the mixed education system from about generation 64 onward. The numerical re-
sult in Panel (b) of Figure 8 shows that the negative eect of the tax burden increase
outweighs the positive eect of the public education expenditure increase, suggesting that
introducing a compulsory public school system makes type-L agents in the rst generation
worse o.
From the second generation onward, there is an additional positive eect via the
human capital formation generated by the compulsory public school system. The terms
hLt =ht andD
 
hLt
1 
in the above expressions represent this eect. The compulsory public
6In Figure 8, the corner solution, x, is realized in the mixed education system.
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school system encourages human capital formation by type-L agents. This benet rises as
the initial human capital level increases (i.e., the lower is initial inequality). In addition,
this eect amplies the positive eect of public education. Therefore, for the baseline and
low initial inequality cases, introducing a compulsory public school system makes all the
generations from the second one better o. However, for the high initial inequality case, it
takes a long time to realize this welfare improvement because the negative eect remains
strong as initial inequality increases. Indeed, the welfare of type-L agents improves only
from generation 77 onward.7
Panel (c) plots the ratio of type-H agents from generations 1 to 80. In this setting,
they choose private education in the mixed education regime. Thus, their indirect utility
is
V Hmix;t = (1 + ) ln (ht   xt)
hHt
ht
+  lnD
 
hHt
1 
+  ln;
V Hcomp;t = ln (ht   xt )
hHt
ht
+  lnD
 
hHt
1 
+  lnxt ;
where V Hmix;t and V
H
comp;t are the indirect utility in the mixed education system and com-
pulsory public school system, respectively.
Introducing a compulsory public school system has two negative eects on the utility
of type-H agents in the initial period: the tax burden increases from xt to x

t and
expenditure on human capital formation decreases from eHt to x

t . Thus, the change makes
type-H agents in the rst generation worse o. From the second generation onward, these
agents are also worse o because of the additional negative eect caused by the delay in
human capital formation generated by the compulsory public school system. The terms
hHt =ht and D
 
hHt
1 
in the above expressions illustrate this eect. The numerical result
suggests that the shift from the mixed education system to the compulsory public school
system is not Pareto-improving.
Finally, we investigate the eect of the compulsory public school system on social
welfare dened by the weighted average utility of the two types, V L + (1   )V H . Its
introduction decreases social welfare in the rst generation because both types of agents
are worse o. However, the eect on welfare from the second generation onward depends
on the initial inequality level: welfare improves earlier as initial inequality decreases, as
illustrated in Panel (d). This result suggests that the social welfare ranking of the multiple
equilibria depends on the initial inequality condition.
7In other words, when private education is available, type-L agents are more likely to be worse o as
initial inequality increases.
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7 Extensions and Further Analysis
Thus far, the following issues have been abstracted from the analysis: (i) fertility decisions;
(ii) intergenerational income mobility; (iii) the policy preferences of type-H agents; and
(iv) cases including three or more types of agents. This section briey considers how the
analysis and results would change when any of these issues are included in the analysis. A
supplementary explanation of the results presented in this section is provided in Appendix
B.
7.1 Fertility Decisions
In this subsection, we briey introduce the fertility decisions of adults into the model. In
particular, we follow de la Croix and Doepke (2004) and assume that adults care about
both family size and education level. The utility maximization of a type-i adult is as
follows:
max
fcit;nit+1;eit;qitg
ln cit +  ln
 
1 + nit+1

hit+1
s.t. cit +
 
1 + nit+1

eit  (1  t)hit
 
1    1 + nit+1 ;
hit+1 = D
 
hit
1  
qitxt +
 
1  qit

eit
	
given hit; t; and xt;
where nit+1(> 0) is the fertility rate, and thus 1+n
i
t+1 is the number of children per type-i
adult, and  2 (0; 1) is an adult's time spent raising one child.
We solve the utility maximization problem for the cases of qit = 1 and 0, and obtain
1 + nit+1

qit=0
=
 (1  )
 (1 + )
< 1 + nit+1

qit=1
=

 (1 + )
:
This expression indicates that family size when choosing private education (qit = 0) is
smaller than that when choosing public education (qit = 1). Following the same procedure
as in Section 3, we obtain the indirect utility functions, V ix;t and V
i
e;t, as well as the
following condition of education choice:
qit =

1 (public education) if V ix;t > V
i
e;t , ~(1  t)hit < xt;
0 (private education) if V ix;t  V ie;t , ~(1  t)hit  xt;
where ~ is dened as ~  (1  )(1 )= : This condition implies that a higher fertility
cost (i.e., a larger ) incentivizes adults to substitute family size with education level (i.e.,
having fewer children with a higher standard of education) by choosing private schooling.
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Given the condition above, we can write the education choices of both types of agents
in the period-t economic equilibrium as follows:
 
qLt ; q
H
t

=
8<:
(0; 0) if xt  ~x00t ;
(1; 0) if ~x10t < xt  ~xt;
(1; 1) if ~x11t < xt;
where ~x00t ; ~x
10
t ; ~x
11
t ; and ~x; as dened in Appendix B, correspond to x
00
t ; x
10
t ; x
11
t ; and xt
in the main analysis, respectively. The expression suggests that the education choice in
the period-t economic equilibrium remains qualitatively unchanged when fertility choice is
introduced into the analysis. Thus, the policy preferences of the type-L majority and as-
sociated political equilibrium characterization would also remain qualitatively unchanged.
The long-run consequences of inequality, however, are aected by the introduction
of fertility decisions. The steady state with  < 1, which is observed in the absence
of fertility decisions, is infeasible in the long run. That is, a unique steady state with
 = 1 always exists in the presence of fertility decisions. To show this, let us denote
by t the share of type-L agents in generation t and by N
L
t
 
NHt

the type-L (type-H)
population in generation t: When
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 1); both types of agents choose public
education and thus the population growth rates for each are identical. Thus, t+1 = t
when
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 1).
When
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0); the fertility rates of type-L and type-H agents are
1 + nLt+1 =

(1 + )
and 1 + nHt+1 =
(1  )
(1 + )
;
respectively. The share of type-L agents in generation t+ 1; t+1, is thus
t+1 =
 
1 + nLt+1
 NLt 
1 + nLt+1
 NLt +  1 + nHt+1 NHt = N
L
t
NLt + (1  )NHt
>
NLt
NLt +N
H
t
= t:
This expression indicates that the share of type-L agents increases as long as the education
choice remains at
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0). Hence, in some future period, the economy changes
so that both types of agents choose public education. Therefore, the steady state with
 < 1 is infeasible in the long run in the presence of fertility decisions.
7.2 Intergenerational Income Mobility
The analysis in Subsection 7.1 showed that the economy reaches a unique steady state
with perfect equality and no enrollment in private schooling in the long run when adults
control fertility from the viewpoint of their utility maximization. However, this model
prediction is not consistent with the evidence in OECD countries. To address this issue,
we add intergenerational income mobility into the framework, following Bernasconi and
Profeta (2012) and Uchida (2017).
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First, children either inherit or not their parents' ability, represented by human capital,
with some probability. In particular, children whose parents are type L are endowed with
hLt with probability 1   u, but with hHt with probability u 2 (0; 1). On the contrary,
children whose parents are type H are endowed with hHt with probability 1   d, but
with hLt with probability d 2 (0; 1). Thus, u and d represent the probabilities of upward
and downward intergenerational mobility for type-L and type-H dynasties, respectively.
Second, parents do not recognize their children's ability (i.e., inherited human capital)
when they make their schooling decisions. This fact implies that parents choose education
to maximize their expected utility.
In this setting, the expected utility functions of type-L and type-H agents are
ULt = ln c
L
t +  ln
 
1 + nLt+1
 h
(1  u)D  hLt 1  + uD  hHt 1 i  1  qLt  eLt + qLt xt	 ;
UHt = ln c
H
t +  ln
 
1 + nHt+1
 h
dD
 
hLt
1 
+ (1  d)D  hHt 1 i  1  qHt  eHt + qHt xt	 ;
respectively. These expressions suggest that the terms including mobility do not aect
individual decisions on fertility, consumption, and education because of the assumption
of a logarithmic utility function. This in turn implies that they do not also aect the
policy preferences of type-L adults. However, mobility does aect the motion of the share
of type-L agents, t, as we demonstrate below.
Suppose that in some period t;
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0) holds in the period-t political equi-
librium. Then, t+1 is given by
t+1 =
(1  u)NLt+1 + dNHt+1
NLt+1 +N
H
t+1
;
where (1   u)NLt+1 is the number of type-L children whose parents are also of type L,
dNHt+1 is the number of type-L children whose parents are type H, and N
L
t+1 + N
H
t+1 is
the population in generation t+ 1: By using NLt+1 =

(1+)
NLt and N
H
t+1 =
(1 )
(1+)
NHt ; the
above expression is reformulated as
t+1 =
(1  u)t + d(1  )(1  t)
t + (1  )(1  t) = (1  u)  (1  )(1  u  d)
1
t
1 t + (1  )
:
Under the assumption of 1  u  d > 0; a unique  2 (0; 1) satises t = t+1. This fact
suggests that the steady state distinguished by
 
qL; qH

= (1; 0) and  < 1 is feasible in
the long run as long as the pair (u; d) is chosen to satisfy t = t+1.
7.3 Type-H Majority
Thus far, we have conducted the analysis by assuming that type-L agents are in the ma-
jority, which reects the right-skewed income distribution in the real economy. However,
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recent studies report that richer and better educated citizens are more likely to vote (see
Hodler, Luechinger, and Stutzer, 2015 and the references therein). Thus, how would the
result change if type-H agents constituted the majority?
To consider the type-H majority case, we assume either that  < 1=2 holds or that
  1=2 but the voting propensity of type-L agents is low. Under this assumption, the
political objective function is the indirect utility function of type-H adults as follows:

t =
8>>>><>>>>:

00;t  V He;t

t=0
= (1 + ) lnhHt +  lnD
 
hHt
1 
+  ln if (qLt ; q
H
t ) = (0; 0);

10;t  V He;t

t=xt=ht
= (1 + ) ln (1  xt=ht)hHt
+ lnD
 
hHt
1 
+  ln
if (qLt ; q
H
t ) = (1; 0);

11;t  V Hx;t

t=xt=ht
= ln (1  xt=ht)hHt +  lnD
 
hHt
1 
+  lnxt if (q
L
t ; q
H
t ) = (1; 1):
The objective function has the following properties (see Appendix B for the proof):

00;t  
10;t; = holds if xt = 0; and

00;t > 
11;t:
These conditions state that type-H agents, as the majority, prefer no provision of public
education to both types of agents. This is because when they choose the provision of
public education either to type-L agents or to both types of agents, they pay more than
they receive from such a provision. Therefore, a unique period-t political equilibrium
is distinguished by (x; ) = (0; 0) when type-H agents are the majority. This result
together with that in the main analysis suggests that when we consider voting such that
the political objective function is the weighted sum of the utility functions of both types
of agents, public education is more likely to be provided in the political equilibrium as
the political weight attached to type-L agents increases.
7.4 Three or More Types of Agents
To check the robustness of the results for cases of three or more types of agents, we nally
consider the three types of family dynasties indexed by i 2 fL;M;Hg. The proportion
of type-i individuals in each generation is i with
P
i 
i = 1. Education choice, qit,
in (3) applies to the present case, and the government's budget constraint is given byP
i q
i
t
ixt = tht, where average human capital is now redened as ht 
P
i 
ihit:
The education choices of these three types of agents in the period-t economic equilib-
rium are summarized as follows (see Appendix B for the derivation):
 
qLt ; q
M
t ; q
H
t

=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(0; 0; 0) if xt  hLt ;
(1; 0; 0) if 

1  Lxt
ht

hLt < xt  

1  Lxt
ht

hMt ;
(1; 1; 0) if 

1  (
L+M)xt
ht

hMt < xt  

1  (
L+M)xt
ht

hHt ;
(1; 1; 1) if 

1  xt
ht

hHt < xt:
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This expression shows that the choices are qualitatively similar to those of the two-type
case in the sense that lower-income agents are more likely to choose public education.
This result, accompanied with the nding reported in the previous subsection, suggests
that public education is more widely provided as the political weight to lower-income
agents increases.
8 Conclusion
This study presents a political economy theory to explain why countries with higher in-
equality are associated with lower public education enrollment. We base the theory on a
two-class (high and low) successive generations model with human capital accumulation
and the choice to opt out of public education accompanied by voting on education policy.
This condition creates multiple locally stable steady-state equilibria: one with low in-
equality and high public education enrollment and the other with high inequality and low
public education enrollment. This study is novel in that it shows the negative correlation
observed in OECD countries in the mutual interaction of inequality and education.
From an equity viewpoint, it is desirable to attain a low-inequality steady state. One
path to this steady state involves introducing compulsory public schooling. We use a
simulation to investigate the welfare implications of introducing this reform and nd that it
makes high-income families worse o, while improving the outcomes of future generations
of low-income families at the expense of the current generation. These results suggest
that the multiple equilibria are not Pareto-ranked and that the shift from the existing
mixed education system to a compulsory public school system is not Pareto-improving.
As a caveat to the analysis, note that we base our analysis on the assumption that
the tax rate is adjusted to satisfy the government budget constraint. This implies that
per capita expenditure on public education may decrease as the number of opting-out
students increases. However, in the real world, fewer students in public education may
result in a higher quality of education for these students. To consider this possibility, we
alternatively assume that the tax rate is xed. Under this assumption, the government
budget constraint becomes
ht =

xt if
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0);
xt if
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 1);
where  2 (0; 1) is xed. This constraint indicates that students in public education
can benet from a higher per capita expenditure-to-GDP ratio, xt=ht, as the number of
opting-out students increases. However, there is no voting on spending since xt is adjusted
to satisfy the government budget constraint given  and ht.
Further, we base our analysis on the assumption of xed class sizes. This assumption
makes the analysis tractable and yields clear intuitions. In particular, the assumption
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enables us to obtain a closed-form solution and demonstrate the evolution of human
capital across generations. In addition, from an empirical point of view, the assumption
is reasonable|at least for some class-structured societies. However, the result would
change if we assumed intergenerational class mobility. Section 7.2 attempts to include
mobility into the framework, but the analysis is limited in the sense that mobility is
exogenous. Relaxing this assumption would be interesting to explore and is left for future
work.
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A Appendices
A.1 Proof of (7)
Recall the denition of x00t ; x
10
t ; xt; and x
11
t in the text. We compare these as follows:
x00t ? x11t , 0 ? f (t)   (t)2   (1 + ) t + 1;
x00t ? xt , 0 ? g (t)  2 (t)2   (1 + ) t + 1;
x10t ? x11t , 0 ? h (t)   (1  ) (t)2   (1 +  (1  )) t + 1;
where (i) f(0) = g(0) = h(0) > 0; (ii) f () < g () < h () for any t 2 (0; 1] ; and (iii)
f 0 () < 0; g0 () < 0; and h0 () < 0 for any t 2 (0; 1). As illustrated in Figure A.1, there
are three critical values of t; denoted by 
l; m; and h, where 0 < l < m < h < 1;
such that f
 
l

= 0; g (m) = 0; and h
 
h

= 0: From Figure A.1, we obtain (7).
[Figure A.1 here.]

A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that t 2
 
0; l

: Figure A.1 shows that in this case, x00t < x
11
t ; x
00
t < xt; and
x10t < x
11
t hold. In addition, direct calculation leads to
x10t < x
00
t and x
10
t ; x
11
t < xt.
Thus, we obtain x10t < x
00
t < x
11
t < xt, as illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 2. This gure
shows that there is a unique economic equilibrium if xt 2 (0; x10t ), (x00t ; x11t ] ; or (xt; ht);
otherwise, there are multiple economic equilibria.
Following the same procedure, we can show the uniqueness or multiplicity of the
economic equilibria for the remaining three cases: t 2

l; m

;

m; h

; and

h; 1

.
There is a unique economic equilibrium if any of the following three conditions hold: (i)
t 2

l; m

and xt 2 (0; x10t ] or (xt; ht), as illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 2; (ii)
t 2

m; h

and xt 2 (0; x10t ] or (x00t ; ht), as illustrated in Panel (c) of Figure 2; and
(iii) t 2

h; 1

and xt 2 (0; x11t ] or (x00t ; ht), as illustrated in Panel (d) of Figure 2.
Proposition 1 summarizes the results established thus far.

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A.3 Proof of (10)
The rst condition, 
11;t < 
10;t 8xt > 0; is immediate from the denitions of 
11;t and

10;t. We show the second condition, x
00
t < x

t , with a direct comparison:
x00t < x

t , tht <

1 + 
ht , t < (1 + )1= ;
which holds for any t < 1 and  2 (0; 1) :
To show the third condition, 
10;tjxt=x00t < 
00;t; we compare 
10;tjxt=x00t with 
00;t;
and obtain

10;tjxt=x00t < 
00;t , ln (1  t) tht +  lntht < (1 + ) ln tht +  ln
, ln (1  t) < 0:
The last inequality holds since ln (1  t) < ln 1 = 0:
To show the fourth condition, we rst compare 
00;t with 
11;tjxt=xt , and obtain

00;t < 
11;tjxt=xt , (1 + ) ln tht +  ln < ln

1  
1 + 

tht +  ln

1 + 
ht
,  ln t < 0;
where the last inequality holds since ln t < ln 1 = 0: The inequality 
11;tjxt=xt <

10;tjxt=xt is immediate since 
11;tjxt=xt < 
10;tjxt=xt < 
10;tjxt=xt :

A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
The text provides the following statement:
argmax
t = x

t if t 2 (0; ] and  2


+ 
; 1

:
The remaining task is to show that there is  2 (; m) such that

10;tjxt=xt 7 
11;tjxt=xt , t ? 
; (13)
where

10;tjxt=xt = ln (ht   xt) t +  lnD (htt)
1  +  ln xt;

11;tjxt=xt = ln (ht   x

t ) t +  lnD (htt)
1  +  lnxt :
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A direct comparison of 
10;tjxt=xt with 
11;tjxt=xt leads to

10;tjxt=xt 7 
11;tjxt=xt
, ln
 
ht   
1 t
1 
1 + 1 t
1 
ht
!
+  ln
1 t
1 
1 + 1 t
1 
ht
7 ln

ht   
1 + 
ht

+  ln

1 + 
ht
, ln

1 t
1 


1 + 1 t
1 
1+ 7 ln ()(1 + )1+
,

1  t
1  
=(1+)
| {z }
LHS
7 1 + 1  t
1  | {z }
RHS
; (14)
where the LHS and RHS in (14) are increasing in t.
At t = 
  (1   (1  ) =) =;
LHSjt= > RHSjt= ,

1

=(1+)
> 1;
which holds for any  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1). It also holds that
lim
!m
LHS < lim
!m
RHS , 
10;tjxt=xt;=m < 
11;tjxt=xt ;=m ;
where the second inequality condition holds, as shown in Lemma 1. Therefore, a unique
t; denoted by 
 2 (; m) ; satises (14) with an equality.
To summarize, the results thus are
argmax
t =
8><>:
xt = argmax
11;t if 
 < t < m;
xt = argmax
10;t if t 2 (0; ] and  2


+
; 1

;
xt if max (0; 
) < t  ;
where
max (0; ) =
8<: 0 if  2

1
2
; 
+
i
;
 if  2


+
; 1

;
because  ? 0,  ? 
+
.
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A.5 Derivation of P11 () ; P10 () ; and P10 ()
First, assume t 2 (; 1]: both types of agents choose public education, (qL; qH) = (1; 1).
The average human capital in period t+ 1 is
ht+1 = h
L
t+1 + (1  )hHt+1
= D
 
hLt
1 
(xt)
 + (1  )D  hHt 1  (xt) :
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By using this expression, we can reformulate t+1 = h
L
t+1=ht+1 as
t+1 =
D
 
hLt
1 
(xt)

D (hLt )
1 
(xt)
 + (1  )D (hHt )1  (xt)
=
"
+ (1  )

hHt
hLt
1 # 1
=
"
+ (1  )

1
t
  
1 # 1
;
where the equality on the third line comes from hHt =h
L
t = (1=t   ) =(1  ):
Next, assume t 2 (0; ]: type-L agents choose public education and type-H agents
choose private education. The human capital equation of type-H agents is
hHt+1 = D
 
hHt
1   
1 + 
(1  t)hHt

= DhHt


1 + 
 
1  xt
ht

;
where the rst equality comes from the private education function, eHt =  (1  t)hHt = (1 + ),
and the second equality comes from the government's budget constraint, xt = tht. With
hLt+1 = D
 
hLt
1 
(xt)
 ; the period t+ 1 inequality index, t+1, becomes
t+1 =
D
 
hLt
1 
(xt)

D (hLt )
1 
(xt)
 + (1  )DhHt


1+
 
1  xt
ht

=
24+ (1  )hHt


1+
 
1  xt
ht

(hLt )
1 
(xt)

35 1 : (15)
Assume the corner solution,
xt = xt 
1 t
1 
1 + 1 t
1 
ht:
By substituting this into (15) and rearranging the terms, we obtain P10 (), as in the text.
Alternatively, assume the interior solution, xt = x

t = ht=(1 + ): By substituting
this into (15) and rearranging the terms, we obtain P10 (), as in the text.

A.6 Properties of P11 () ; P10 () ; and P10 ()
(i) Claim 1: P11 () ; P10 () ; and P10 () are strictly increasing int.
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This claim is immediate from the expressions of P11 () ; P10 () ; and P10 () in the text.
(ii) Claim 2: P10 () R P10 () if and only if t R :
We directly compare P10 () with P10 () and obtain
P10 () R P10 (), (1  ) (1 + )1=

1  t
(1  ) t
1 
R

t
1 + 
 
1  t
t

, t R   1



1  1  

 


:
(iii) Claim 3: P10 () < P11 () 8t 2 (0; 1] :
We directly compare P10 () with P11 () and obtain
P10 () < P11 ()
, (1  )

1
t
  
1 
< (1  ) (1 + )1=

1  t
(1  ) t
1 
, 1 < (1 + )1= ;
which holds for any  2 (0; 1).
(iv) Claim 4: P11 () satises P11 (1) = 1 and P 011 (1) = 1   2 (0; 1):
P11 (1) = 1 is immediate from the denition of P11 () in the text. The rst dierenti-
ation of P11 () with respect to  is
P 011 (t) =
"
+ (1  )

1
t
  
1 # 2
(1  ) (1  )

1
t
  
 
1
(t)
2 :
We evaluate this at t = 1 to obtain P
0
11 (1) = 1   2 (0; 1):
(v) Claim 5: P10 () satises P10 (0) = 0 and lim!0
 
@ P10 () =@t

=1; P10 () satises
P10 (0) = 0 and lim!0 (@P10 () =@t) =1.
We obtain P10 (0) = 0 and P10 (0) = 0 by directly substituting t = 0 into P10 () and
P10 (). To show lim!0
 
@ P10 () =@t

= 1; we dierentiate P10 () with respect to t.
After rearranging the terms, we obtain
@ P10 ()
@t
=
(1  ) (1 + )1= (1  )
+ (1  ) (1 + )1=

1 t
(1 )t
1 2
 (t)2 

1 t
t
 ;
or
@ P10 ()
@t
= (1  ) (1 + )1= (1  ) ()2 (t)2  (1  t)
+2(1  ) (1 + )1= t (1  t)
1   +
n
(1  ) (1 + )1=
o2 1
1  
2(1 )
(t)

# 1
:
By evaluating this at t = 0; we obtain limt!0 P
0
10 () = +1.
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To show lim!0 (@P10 () =@t) = 1; we follow the same procedure described above.
Dierentiating P10 () with respect to t yields
@P10 ()
@t
=


1 + 

[t + (1  ) (1  t)]

"
()2 (t)
2  + 2


1 + 

(1  t) t +


1 + 
2
(1  t)2 (t)
# 1
:
We evaluate this at t = 0 and obtain
lim
t!0
@P10 ()
@t
=


1 + 

[0 + (1  ) (1  0)] (0) 1 = +1:
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A.7 Data Description
The sources of data used in Panel (a) of Figure 1 and the simulation analysis in Section 6
are as follows. We use data on 33 OECD member countries because our concern is about
the association between inequality and education choice in developed economies. We take
the average of the Gini coecients (market income, before taxes and transfers) during
2000{2013 for each country (Source: OECD.Stat (http://stats.oecd.org/), accessed on
June 29, 2017). We classify the countries into two groups: a high-inequality group includ-
ing countries above the OECD average and a low-inequality group including countries
below the OECD average.
The high-inequality group includes Austria, Belgium, Chile, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxemburg, Poland, Portugal,
Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The low-inequality group
includes Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Iceland, Korea, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. Hungary and
Mexico are not included in either group because of the lack of data.
Based on the classication above, we also compute the average percentage of en-
rollment in primary education in private institutions for each group (Source: UNESCO
Institute for Statistics (http://uis.unesco.org/), accessed on June 29, 2017). According to
the data source, private enrollment refers to \pupils or students enrolled in institutions
that are not operated by a public authority but controlled and managed, whether for
prot or not, by a private body such as a nongovernmental organization, religious body,
special interest group, foundation or business enterprise." We also take the data on gov-
ernment expenditure on primary education as a percentage of GDP for each country from
the same source.
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The sources of Panel (b) of Figure 1 are as follows. The data of Gini coecients are
collected from OECD.Stat (http://stats.oecd.org/) (accessed on February 7, 2019). We
compute the ratio of private to total spending on primary education using the following
data: OECD, 2019, Education spending (indicator). doi: 10.1787/ca274bac-en (Accessed
on 07 February 2019), and OECD, 2019, Private spending on education (indicator). doi:
10.1787/6e70bede-en (Accessed on 07 February 2019). According to the data source,
private spending on education refers to \expenditure funded by private sources which are
households and other private entities."

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B Supplementary Materials (Not for Publication)
B.1 Supplementary Explanation for Subsection 7.1
Here, we derive the four critical values of xt; ~x
00
t ; ~x
10
t ; ~x
11
t ; and ~xt. We rst consider
education choice by a type-i adult. Suppose that he or she chooses private education,
qit = 0. Solving his or her utility maximization problem by assuming q
i
t = 0 leads to the
following indirect utility function:
V ie;t = ln
1
1 + 
(1  t)hit +  ln
 (1  )
 (1 + )
D
 
hit
1   
1   (1  t)h
i
t

:
Alternatively, suppose that qit = 1 holds. Then, the indirect utility function becomes
V ix;t = ln
1
1 + 
(1  t)hit +  ln

 (1 + )
D
 
hit
1 
(xt)
 :
Thus, type-i's education choice is
qit =

1 (public education) if V ix;t > V
i
e;t , ~(1  t)hit < xt;
0 (private education) if V ix;t  V ie;t , ~(1  t)hit  xt; (16)
where ~ is dened as ~  (1  )(1 )= :
Next, consider education choices in the period-t economic equilibrium. Within the
framework in Subsection 7.1, the government's budget constraint in period t is
qLt
 
1 + nLt+1

t + q
H
t
 
1 + nHt+1

(1  t)
	
xt = tht:
When
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (0; 0); the constraint is reduced to t = 0 because both types of agents
opt out of public education. The substitution of t = 0 into (16) leads to
qLt = 0 if ~h
L
t  xt; qHt = 0 if ~hHt  xt:
Thus, we obtain
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (0; 0) if xt  ~x00t  ~tht:
When
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0); the period-t government's budget constraint is
 
1 + nLt+1

txt =
tht; or
t =
t
 (1 + )
 xt
ht
:
We substitute this into (16) and obtain
qLt = 1 if ~x
10
t 
~t
1 + t
(1+)
~t
ht < xt;
qHt = 0 if xt  ~xt 
~1 tt
1 t
1 + ~1 tt
1 t
t
(1+)
ht:
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Finally, when
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 1); the period-t government's budget constraint is 
1 + nLt+1

t +
 
1 + nHt+1

(1  t)
	
xt = tht;
or
t =

 (1 + )
 xt
ht
:
With (16), we obtain
qLt = 1 if ~

1  
 (1 + )
 xt
ht

hLt < xt;
qHt = 1 if ~

1  
 (1 + )
 xt
ht

hHt < xt:
Therefore, we have
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 1) if
~x11t  ~

1  
 (1 + )
 xt
ht

hHt < xt:
B.2 Supplementary Explanation for Subsection 7.2
First, we compare 
00;t  
10;t and obtain

00;t  
10;t , (1 + ) lnhHt  (1 + ) ln (1  xt=ht)hHt
, 0  (1 + ) ln (1  xt=ht) ;
where the right-hand side of the second line is negative if xt > 0 and zero if xt = 0:
Let ~xt denote argmax
11;t: ~x

t  ht=(1 + ): Direct calculation leads to

00;t > 
11;tjxt=~xt , lnh
H
t > lnht;
which holds for any hHt and ht.
B.3 Supplementary Explanation for Subsection 7.4
Suppose rst that
 
qLt ; q
M
t ; q
H
t

= (0; 0; 0) holds. The government's budget constraint is
reduced to t = 0. The substitution of t = 0 into (3) leads to
qLt = 0 if xt  hLt ; qMt = 0 if xt  hMt ; and qHt = 0 if xt  hHt :
Thus, we obtain
 
qLt ; q
M
t ; q
H
t

= (0; 0; 0) if xt  hLt :
Second, suppose that
 
qLt ; q
M
t ; q
H
t

= (1; 0; 0) holds. The government's budget con-
straint is rewritten as Lxt = tht. By substituting this into (3) and rearranging the
35
terms, we obtain
qLt = 1 if 

1  
Lxt
ht

hLt < xt;
qMt = 0 if xt  

1  
Lxt
ht

hMt ;
qHt = 0 if xt  

1  
Lxt
ht

hHt :
Thus,
 
qLt ; q
M
t ; q
H
t

= (1; 0; 0) holds if


1  
Lxt
ht

hLt < xt  

1  
Lxt
ht

hMt :
Third, suppose that
 
qLt ; q
M
t ; q
H
t

= (1; 1; 0) holds. The government's budget constraint
is rewritten as
 
L + M

xt = tht. We substitute this into (3) and rearrange the terms
to obtain
qLt = 1 if 
 
1 
 
L + M

xt
ht
!
hLt < xt;
qMt = 0 if 
 
1 
 
L + M

xt
ht
!
hMt < xt;
qHt = 0 if xt  
 
1 
 
L + M

xt
ht
!
hHt :
Thus, we have
 
qLt ; q
M
t ; q
H
t

= (1; 1; 0) if

 
1 
 
L + M

xt
ht
!
hMt < xt  
 
1 
 
L + M

xt
ht
!
hHt :
Finally, suppose that
 
qLt ; q
M
t ; q
H
t

= (1; 1; 1) holds. The government's budget con-
straint is rewritten as xt = tht. We substitute this into (3) and rearrange the terms to
obtain
qit = 1 if 

1  xt
ht

hit < xt; i = L;M;H:
Thus, we have
 
qLt ; q
M
t ; q
H
t

= (1; 1; 1) if


1  xt
ht

hHt < xt:
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Figure 1: Average Gini coecient and the average percentage of enrollment in primary
private education institutions for OECD countries during 2000{2013 (Panel (a)); average
Gini coecient and the average ratio of private to total spending on primary education
during 2012{2013 (Panel (b)). Sources of the data are described in Appendix A.7.
Note: Sample periods are dierent for each panel because of dierent data availability.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: t 2
 
0; l

case (Panel (a)); t 2

l; m

case (Panel (b)); t 2

m; h

case
(Panel (c)); t 2

h; 1

case (Panel (d)).
Note: The horizontal arrows below the xt line show the ranges of xt realizing the education
choice
 
qLt ; q
H
t

in the economic equilibrium. For example, in Panel (a), the education
choice of
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (0; 0) occurs when xt is set within the range (0; x
00
t ).
40
Figure 3: Education choice
 
qLt ; q
H
t

classied according to xt.
Note: See the note in Figure 2 for an explanation of the horizontal arrows below the xt
line.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4: Illustration of the political objective function for the t 2

m; h

case (Panel
(a)) and the t 2

h; 1

case (Panel (b)).
Note: The solid (dotted) curves illustrate the feasible (infeasible) political objective func-
tion. For example, in Panel (a), the education choice
 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0) arises in the
economic equilibrium for the range of xt 2 (x10t ; xt]. The corresponding political objec-
tive function, 
10;t, is illustrated by the solid curve within the range (x
10
t ; xt]. Outside
that range, the function is illustrated by the dotted curve, implying that the choice of 
qLt ; q
H
t

= (1; 0) is infeasible.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5: Illustration of the political objective function for the case of t 2
 
0; l

and
xt  xt (Panel (a)) and the case of t 2

l; m

and xt > xt (Panel (b)).
Note: See the note in Figure 4 for an explanation of the solid and dotted curves.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 6: P10 (
) >  case (Panel (a)) and P10 ()   case (Panels (b) and (c)).
Note: The curves denoted by P10(); P10 () ; and P11 () illustrate the motions of t repre-
sented by t+1 = P10(t); P10 (t) ; and P11 (t), respectively.
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Figure 7: The horizontal axis takes ; and the vertical axis takes . Multiple steady-
state equilibria for the shaded area; a unique steady-state equilibrium for the non-shaded
area.
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Figure 8: Ratios of mixed education systems to compulsory public school systems in
terms of per capita public education expenditure (Panel (a)), utility of type-L agents
(Panel (b)), utility of type-H agents (Panel (c)), and social welfare (Panel (d)) for the
three initial inequality scenarios. The solid curves, dashed curves, and dot-dashed curves
correspond to the baseline case, high initial inequality case, and low initial inequality case,
respectively.
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(a) Type-L's utility
Baseline High inequality Low inequality
Generation 1 0.99967 0.99961 0.9998
Generation 2 1.0025 0.9993 1.0063
Generation 3 1.0043 0.99879 1.0108
Generation 4 1.0055 0.99822 1.014
(b) Type-H's utility
Baseline High inequality Low inequality
Generation 1 0.99955 0.99943 0.99975
Generation 2 0.97352 0.96847 0.979
Generation 3 0.95657 0.94861 0.96528
Generation 4 0.94529 0.93553 0.95604
(c) Social welfare
Baseline High inequality Low inequality
Generation 1 0.99966 0.99959 0.9998
Generation 2 0.99957 0.99633 1.0034
Generation 3 0.99932 0.99369 1.0059
Generation 4 0.999 0.99159 1.0076
Table 1: Ratios of mixed education systems to compulsory public school systems in terms
of the utility of type-L agents (Panel (a)), the utility of type-H agents (Panel (b)), and
social welfare (Panel (c)) for the three initial inequality scenarios from generation 1 to
generation 4.
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Figure A.1: Illustration for Condition (7).
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